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Abstract
The chairman of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR) of the Russian Orthodox
Church (ROC) Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) was dismissed from his office on the 104th day
(June 7, 2022) of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Was Hilarion dismissed because of his ‘silence’
on the Russian invasion?
We study the 104 ‘war days’ of Metropolitan Hilarion from four dimensions: leadership as
position; leadership as process; leadership as result; and leadership as person. Our findings are
multivocal: the Russian invasion of Ukraine did become a leadership challenge for Hilarion the
way that previous military interventions (in Ukraine and Syria) and thorough broadening of the
collaboration between the Church and the military in Russia during his 13 years as the Chairman
of the DECR did not; Hilarion refrained from the rhetoric (religious demonization of the
adversaries) and narratives (e.g. ‘spiritual brothers cannot be in conflict,’ labelling the conflict ‘an
internecine strife’) used by Patriarch Kirill, but Hilarion still opted to leave his position of professor
in Fribourg University instead of condemning (delegitimizing) the Russian invasion of Ukraine;
Hilarion had contributed to Patriarch Kirill’s doctrine of the ‘Russian world’ since 2009 and did
not revoke any of his related positions during the 104 days of war. As the ‘religious’ concept of
the “Russian world” is the key narrative whereby religious leaders of the ROC have legitimated
Russian imperialism over the territory and population of Ukraine, the key indicator for Hilarion’s
assumed ‘silence’ should be the rejection of the Russian world doctrine, not his commitment to
the principle “war is not a conflict solution method.” Finally, we observe his successor
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(Metropolitan Anthony) to be even less vocal than Hilarion on religious and geopolitical issues
related to Ukraine.
This period studied started with a secular critical juncture (start of invasion) and ended with a
critical juncture in religious relations on Ukrainian territories occupied by the Russian Federation,
when with the June 7, 2022, decision of the Holy Synod of the ROC to relocate dioceses of the
Orthodox Church in Crimea into direct subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate, the latter
initiated cuius regio, eius religio paradigm in its relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of
Moscow Patriarchate).
Keywords: religious leadership; leader personality; conflict escalation; critical junctures; RussianUkrainian conflict, 2014-; Russian invasion of Ukraine, 2022; religion and international relations;
war; Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev); Russian Orthodox Church.
Prologue
The turbulence of war sets out challenges before leaders that they may not meet fully or
adequately. 1 Chaos threatens everywhere, and there are a multitude of questions arising rapidly
and in crosscurrents that make it difficult to understand clearly events happening in the moment.
Circumstances are fluid and the need to adapt quickly eludes many leaders. Action is often required
that do not seem to fall under the purview of prior plans. Furthermore, adaptations by some leaders
that are most creative may be seen by other leaders as circumventing their roles or falling outside
the acceptable range of options. And differences of worldview or opinion that were irrelevant
during peacetime may take on an importance during wartime that now rises to a critical level in
decision making.
If one is an autocrat possessing reliable collaborators in administrative roles, perhaps the
problem of leadership is not as acute as it is for those in the second tier who are beholding to the
autocrat. 2 What the autocrat says goes, even if it leads to calamity or error. What the next level
collaborators do is always under the eyes and judgments of the highest level, and missteps may
lead to severe consequences, even when such “missteps” may be saner or more effective for
reaching the goals of the organization than the tack taken by the autocrat or his party.
When one goes against the wishes of the autocrat, the consequences can be dramatic. In
this paper, we examine a major leadership shake-up in the Russian Orthodox Church and its

David Keen, “War and peace: What’s the difference?” International Peacekeeping 7, no. 4 (2000), 1–22.
P. D. Harms, Dustin Wood, Karen Landay, Paul B. Lester, and Gretchen Vogelgesang Lester, “Autocratic leaders
and authoritarian followers revisited: A review and agenda for the future,” The Leadership Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2018),
106.
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uppermost leadership in the Moscow Patriarchate. Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev) heads the
patriarchate as an autocrat would. He is the unchallenged leader occupying the patriarchal throne. 3
We search for the reasons for the demotion of Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev), a hierarch seen by
most as the “second in command” of the ROC, just a step away from the throne. Our goal is not
simply an attempt to describe the leadership change. We seek to understand more fully the
dynamics of leadership in the Church and, most importantly, the relationship the Church leaders
have with the Russian state leaders in a time of war; that is, with Vladimir Putin in the time of the
invasion of Ukraine by the Russian military. The war involves the collaboration of two large
human organizations each headed by an autocrat who, in turn, is managing relations among a group
of significant second-level leaders. The potential for leadership clashes and conflict as war unfolds
is obvious.
Introduction
On June 7, 2022, the 104th day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Hilarion (Alfeyev) was
dismissed from his duties as Metropolitan of Volokolamsk, member of the Holy Synod of the
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and head of the Department of External Church Relations
(DECR) of the Moscow Patriarchate. On that day, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church
also heard the report of Hilarion’s visit to Hungary (from June 1 until June 5); expressed gratitude
to the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, for refusing to include Patriarch Kirill in the EU
sanctions list; responded to the recent declaration of change of the status of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church (Moscow Patriarchate); and transferred Hilarion to the position of primate of the Russian
Orthodox Dioceses of Budapest and Hungary. 4
The transfer of Hilarion to Hungary is a strategic step forward for the ROC. Hilarion may
be of instrumental use in Hungary for the ROC in several ways. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary is a
strategic partner for the Russian Federation–Orbán’s attitude towards Russia is more positive than
that of any other head of government in the EU; 5 Orbán’s government is committed to traditional
We use the term “throne” intentionally. The Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia is indeed enthroned when he takes
on his office. Per-Arne Bodin, “The Enthronement of Patriarch Kirill: A Liturgical Event,” in Orthodox Paradoxes:
Heterogeneities and Complexities in Contemporary Russian Orthodoxy, ed. Katya Tolstaya (Leiden and Boston: Brill,
2014), 56–70.
4
Journals of the Holy Synod from June 7 2022, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/print/5934527.html.
5
In the first months of 2022, President of Russia Vladimir Putin had probably more meetings and phone conversations
with the President of France Emmanuel Macron than with Viktor Orbán, but the atmosphere and style of conversation
have been more open and mutually understanding during his meetings with Orbán. For example, in a joint news
3
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values strategically promoted also by the Russian Federation; 6 the exclusion of Patriarch Kirill
from the package of EU sanctions against Russia thanks to Hungary’s objection just a couple of
days before the dismissal and transfer of Hilarion is significant for both the ROC and the Russian
Federation. 7
By contrast, for Hilarion personally the transfer to Hungary was a leap downwards in
church hierarchy and in his church career. First, in Budapest he administers a very small number
of priests and parishes. Previous heads of the Hungarian branch of the ROC administered also
some other diocese. Before 2009, Hilarion himself administered both the Vienna-Austrian and
Hungarian dioceses. In June 2022 he received the position from Metropolitan Mark of Ryazan who
was the head of the Ryazan Metropolia and the Budapest-Hungarian dioceses. Metropolitan
Hilarion received only the Budapest-Hungarian diocese, which in June 2022 had only ten churches,
11 active priests and 4 deacons. 8
Second, he was dismissed from positions which, inside the ROC, are lower only in regard
to the Patriarch. Before dismissal he was considered the highly likely successor to Patriarch Kirill,
“the church’s de facto crown prince.” 9 The position of administrator of the Budapest-Hungarian
dioceses enables Hilarion to abstain from commenting on the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
Ukraine-related geopolitics, and global inter-Orthodox politics. In the new office Hilarion has an
opportunity to devote himself first and foremost to parishes, theology, and church music. He may
‘save face’ among the audiences that have included him in the list of high-ranking leaders of the
ROC to be sanctioned for their ideological legitimation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as long

conference with Putin on February 1, 2022, Orbán said: “We can offer the Hungarian model. The Hungarian model
exists in politics: we are members of NATO and the European Union. Nevertheless, we can maintain excellent
relations with Russia. This is possible. What do we need for this? We need mutual respect. Hungary has always been
respected by President Putin, and we also show such respect for the Russian Federation.“ “News conference following
Russian-Hungarian talks,“ February 1, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67690.
6
On May 16, 2022, Patriarch Kirill congratulated Viktor Orbán for victory in Hungarian national elections with the
words: “You are one of the few European politicians who in his activities pays great attention to the issues of
supporting Christian values, strengthening the institution of the traditional family and the norms of public morality. I
know you as an active defender of persecuted Christians in the Middle East and Africa.” “Congratulations of His
Holiness Patriarch Kirill to Viktor Orbán on his re-election as Prime Minister of Hungary,” May 16, 2022,
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5925864.html.
7
Jorge Liboreiro, Efi Koutsokosta and Shona Murray (2022) “Patriarch Kirill excluded from EU sanctions after
Hungary’s objection,” Euronews, June 2, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/02/patriarch-kirillexcluded-from-eu-sanctions-after-hungary-s-objection.
8
Peter Anderson, “‘Current socio-political situation’ dictated Hilarion’s demotion,” Orthodox Christian Laity, June
12, 2022, https://ocl.org/current-socio-political-situation-dictated-hilarions-demotion/.
9
Elizabeth Braw, “Putin Sacks Top Priest over Ukraine War,” The Center for European Policy Analysis, July 5, 2022,
https://cepa.org/putin-sacks-top-priest-over-ukraine-war/.
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as he ceases to promote the doctrine of the “Russian world.” But transfer to Budapest did not
improve his status in the church hierarchy.
In June 2022, Hilarion explained his dismissal:
I myself do not know many details. They have been told me (sic) that the decision [of
the dismissal] is not linked to any shortcomings or weaknesses in the chairmanship of
the DECR, nor in relation to any ecclesiastical institution that I headed. It has only
been said that this is what the current socio-political situation requires. That the road
made a very steep turn, I couldn’t fit and I ended up on the side of the road. But it’s
better than tipping the car over and exploding. 10
Hilarion’s comment is quite vague. However, because the ROC has not delivered any
explanation, most commentators still rely on Hilarion’s arguments and take at face value the
frames and metaphors given by him: his dismissal was not caused by any fault in his performance
as the Chairman of the DECR; “they” who took the decision did it because of “the current sociopolitical situation”; finally, the ‘road-side’ metaphor should wrap up all loose ends–Hilarion ended
up on the road-side, but luckily did not suffer from a car crash.
Hilarion’s brief comment has too many ambiguous loose ends. If nothing was wrong with
his performance, then “those” who decided to dismiss him, still had to have some reason. The hint
is that the reason is about “the current socio-political situation”; this has been assumed to refer to
the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We do not know who “they” were who decided. It could be the
members of the Holy Synod of the ROC, but it could also be somebody from the Kremlin.
Finally, the use of the ‘road-side’ metaphor is a deliberate tactic to increase ambiguity at
the expense of the imaginary clarity offered by the metaphor. In the efficient use of metaphor, the
audience will focus on the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the metaphor used (which here is the statement
that “a car crash is worse than being left on the road-side”). There is no ambiguity in the idea that
it is better to be on the roadside than to suffer a car-crash. However, the trick is that we still have
no certain knowledge of what this metaphor means regarding the dismissal of Hilarion.
There is “no manual for determining what a metaphor ‘means’ or ‘says’,” 11 but when we
do not hesitate over the meaning of the metaphor in ordinary contexts (we know what a car accident
is) and we stick to the latter, then we are manipulated to feel and believe certainty without having

“What Hilarion said about his dismissal from the DECR and as a Metropolitan of Volokolamsk,” Orthodox Times, June 13, 2022,
https://orthodoxtimes.com/what-hilarion-said-about-his-dismissal-from-the-decr-and-as-a-metropolitan-of-volokolamsk/.
11
Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean”, Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978), 31, 35.
10
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it. We do not know, what was the car accident that Hilarion avoided thanks to (sic!) being
dismissed from the office of chairman of the DECR. Additionally, if we consider that saying
“nothing was wrong with his performance” is his subjective evaluation (and not necessarily fact
supported by evidence), and that terms such as “they” and “the requirements of the current sociopolitical situation” are without fixed meanings, then from Hilarion’s comments we do not know
much with certainty at all.
On July 26, 2022, Hilarion gave additional comments from Budapest in a short video-clip
published on his webpage. He said that his transfer to Hungary is “not an exile” (ссылка). He was
not punished in any way, because “there was nothing to punish him for.” He had no guilt before
the Church, before the Patriarch, and before the Motherland. However, he admitted that he himself
“would never have left Russia” by his own will, but when he was offered to serve abroad, then
Hungary was his own choice. 12
Thus, if he would not have been forced to relocate abroad, he would never have left Russia.
This looks like something still had gone wrong. But what exactly? In order to increase
comprehension on this question, we study 104 war days of Metropolitan Hilarion from four
dimensions of leadership suggested by Keith Grint, Owain Smolović Jones, and Clare Holt:
leadership as position; leadership as process; leadership as result; leadership as person. 13
Leadership as Position
The position of the Chairman of the DECR is very important in the ROC. The person filling
that office is automatically assumed to be the ‘foreign minister of the Church’ and often the
‘number 2’ in the church hierarchy (as if this position lifts the office-holder higher than all other
ministers in the Church, except the Patriarch).
Since 1990 and up to the Summer of 2022, four persons have been chairmen of the DECR
– the present Patriarch, at that time Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) from November 13, 1989, until
February 1, 2009; Archbishop Mark (Golovkov) temporarily from February 11 until March 31,
2009; Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) from March 31, 2009, until June 7, 2022; and Metropolitan

“Metropolitan Hilarion spoke about his life in Budapest,” July 26, 2022, https://hilarion.ru/temple/mitropolitilarion-rasskazal-o-svoey-zhizni-v-budapeshte.html.
13
Keith Grint, Owain Smolović Jones, and Clare Holt, “What Is Leadership: Person, Result, Position or Process, or
All or None of These?” in The Routledge Companion to Leadership, eds. John Storey, Jean Hartley, Jean-Louis Denis,
Paul ‘t Hart and Dave Ulrich (New York and London: Routledge, 2017), 4.
12
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Anthony (Sevryuk) since June 7, 2022. Thus, for most of the period since the fall of the Soviet
Union, two persons (Kirill and Hilarion) have been the chairmen of the DECR.
The position itself, however, does not determine the degree of involvement and influence
of the chairman in relations with the government, with foreign states, with other religions and other
Orthodox Churches. For example, Metropolitan Kirill was highly politically ambitious and in 2001
he was assessed to be “the main Church figure in dialogue with the Kremlin.” 14 Metropolitan Kirill
was also the key messenger of the ROC during Georgia-Russia conflict (and related disputes over
South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s religious independence) in 2008. 15 Despite being “only the
chairman of the DECR,” in specific instances and issues, he acted as ‘number 1.’
The opposite is also possible. The Chairman of the DECR may hold himself back from full
commitment to the duties expected of him by the Church Synod or state government. Particularly,
when ‘times get tough’.
As pointedly observed by Niccolo Machiavelli, when circumstances and affairs change, a
leader is ruined if he does not adapt and “does not change his mode of proceeding.” 16 According
to Marchiavelli, human beings keep certain ‘constancy of conduct’ and act in an invariant fashion
because of deeply rooted psychological traits (the style of leadership that is characteristic to their
person). 17 Therefore, the coming of ‘days’ and ‘times’ of war may be a challenge for them, because
without adapting to the expectations that characterize the situation (or “the requirements of the
socio-political situation,” to use the expression of Hilarion), they will lose their job.
Both Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the Chairman of DECR have reflected
over the ways to adapt to changing circumstances and how to balance the expectations of the
official position with their own character, personality, and habitual dispositions that characterize
them as leaders.
In May 2022 Sergey Lavrov answered questions at the Yevgeny Primakov School. One of
the questions was: “How often does a politician have to make tough decisions that go against

Geraldine Fagan, Believing in Russia: Religious Policy After Communism (London and New York: Routledge,
2013), 40, 42.
15
Kimitaka Matsuzato, “South Ossetia and the Orthodox World: Official Churches, the Greek Old Calendarist
Movement, and the So-called Alan Diocese,” Journal of Church and State 52, no. 2 (2010), 292, 293.
16
Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1998), 100.
17
Megan K. Dyer and Cary J. Nederman, “Machiavelli against Method: Paul Feyerabend’s Anti-Rationalism and
Machiavellian Political ‘Science’,” History of European Ideas 42, no. 3 (2016), 441.
14
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personal convictions in a situation where those decisions must be made? How hard is it to make
them?” Sergey Lavrov answered:
If the decisions that need to be made are at odds with personal convictions, it is better
not to make them. If making them is unavoidable, but they are in conflict with personal
convictions, then one needs to choose between remaining in office or stepping down.
There is no way around it. At least for me. 18
Before the invasion, in the beginning of February 2022, Metropolitan Hilarion was quite
enthusiastic both about his job and about close collaboration between the DECR and the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He did not seem to be facing a stark choice between office and
conscience. With ease he identified DECR figuratively with the defence department:
Our institution is sometimes called the Church Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is
not entirely fair, since we are engaged not only in foreign affairs, but also in interfaith
relations in our Fatherland. And in recent years, we increasingly feel like a kind of
defence department, because we have to defend the sacred borders of our Church. 19
After the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Hilarion’s reflective attitude
became multivocal. In March 2022 he emphasized that diplomatic activities of the state are also
different from the foreign church activities, because “the Russian Orthodox Church is not only the
Church of Russia, but the Church of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the republics of Central Asia, the
Baltic States, as well as Japan, Mongolia and China.” 20 At the end of May, 2022, he seemed to
distance himself and the Church (as he understood its mission) from the state and MFA even more.
He said:
You and I are not responsible for military actions or political decisions. But we are
responsible for our Holy Church. /…/ At the Last Judgment, no one will ask us whether
or not we have participated in any political decisions... 21

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions as part of the 100 Questions for the Leader
project at the Yevgeny Primakov School,” May 23, 2022. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1814502/.
19
“The President of Russia presented Metropolitan Hilarion with the Order of Alexander Nevsky,” February 2, 2022,
https://hilarion.ru/social/prezident-rossii-vruchil-mitropolitu-ilarionu-orden-aleksandra-nevskogo.html.
20
“At the meeting of the scientific lecture hall “Krapivensky 4” the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the
international arena was discussed,” March 9, 2022, https://hilarion.ru/social/na-zasedanii-nauchnogo-lektoriyakrapivenskiy-4-obsudili-rol-russkoy-pravoslavnoy-tserkvi-na-mezhdun.html.
21
“Metropolitan Hilarion: We have supported and will continue to support the unity of our Church,” May 28, 2022,
https://hilarion.ru/social/mitropolit-ilarion-my-podderzhivali-i-budem-dalshe-podderzhivat-edinstvo-nasheytserkvi.html.
18
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In the same message Hilarion added that the hands of the DECR are tied and ultimately
everyone has a personal responsibility for the way they perform in any office:
… in this century, and in the future, we will be asked for our responsibilities, for which
each of us is responsible in his post. /…/ The Department for External Church
Relations is a church institution that does not make its own decisions but helps the
Hierarchy to implement their decisions. We report directly to His Holiness the
Patriarch and the Holy Synod, and have a mandate from them for our activities,
receiving assignments relating to the entire sphere of external church relations. 22
However, increasing collaboration between the ROC and the Russian military since 2009
did not come as a surprise to Hilarion. Kirill started his Patriarchy with Hilarion at the head of the
DECR and with a commitment to develop church-state co-operation first of all in the areas of
military and education. 23 Over the years, “the intertwining of the ROC and the Russian strategic
community” became more visible in the armed forces than in any other sphere. 24 The ROC
provided the Russian military with “the sense of mission” and “higher levels of motivation” in the
Russian military campaign in Syria (starting in 2015) and assisted the Russian government in
legitimizing the intervention domestically. 25 In 2020, the opening of the Main Cathedral of the
Russian Armed Forces was a sign of growing cooperation between the Russian military and the
ROC. The Cathedral was officially “dedicated to the 75th anniversary of Victory in the Great
Patriotic War, as well as the military feats of the Russian people in all wars.” 26
Hence, the collaboration between the ROC and the military increased and broadened during
the 13 years when Hilarion was the chairman of the DECR. Before February 2022, Hilarion
seemed neither to question this development nor to reflect over the issue with the dilemma, where
one has to choose between personal responsibility before God and what it is that is being expected
from the religious leadership.
In April 2022 Hilarion refrained from delivering public comments on Ukraine-related
political and inter-religious (and inter-Orthodox) issues. For him, this could have been a month of
personal reflection. In May 2022 he re-emerged to public debates with a voice that, next to official
“Metropolitan Hilarion: We have supported and will continue to support”.
Fagan, Believing in Russia, 140.
24
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Russian Orthodox Church and Nuclear Command and Control: A Hypothesis,” Security
Studies 28, no. 5 (2019), 1010.
25
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Christ-Loving Warriors: Ecclesiastical Dimension of the Russian Military Campaign in
Syria,” Problems of Post-Communism 67, no. 6 (2020), 433–445.
26
Bojidar Kolov, “Main Cathedral of Mutual Legitimation: The Church of the Russian Armed Forces as a Site of
Making Power Meaningful,” Religions 12, no. 11 (2021): 925. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12110925.
22
23
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positions of the church, involved also personal comments not always and fully overlapping with
the former.
For example, Hilarion seemed to have changed his attitude regarding the Archbishop of
Cyprus. In 2020 he was highly critical of the Archbishop Chrysostomos, because the latter had
commemorated Metropolitan Epifaniy of Kyiv and All Ukraine. 27 As a result, the ROC terminated
Eucharistic communion with the Archbishop of Cyprus.
In the May 22, 2022, program “Church and Peace” on the channel “Russia 24” Hilarion
commented on his recent meeting with the Archbishop of Cyprus with a tone that was more
accepting of the latter than was the official position of the ROC at that time:
First of all, I would like to say that Archbishop Chrysostomos, having learned about
my stay in Cyprus, invited me to have lunch with him. I must say that it was a very
cordial conversation. Archbishop Chrysostomos during this conversation spoke in
great detail about the efforts he made to reconcile the Orthodox Churches. When it
became known about the decision of the Patriarch of Constantinople to legalize the
Ukrainian schism, then Archbishop Chrysostomos took on a mediation mission and
toured several Local Churches. /…/ I would like to say that, of course, such sad events
in the history of relations between the Churches occur from time to time. /…/ It seems
to me that all these Local Churches understand the importance of the Russian Orthodox
Church and the need to maintain dialogue, despite what has happened. 28
One day before the dismissal of Hilarion, the Archbishop of Cyprus claimed to have much
better mutual understanding with Hilarion than with Patriarch Kirill:
I told Hilarion to tell Patriarch Kirill that he should give up his mistakes and start
commemorating us. We are commemorating him; I send him letters and he replies.
/…/ Kirill has pressed all the Metropolitans down. He is very selfish, and the
Metropolitans are afraid to be close to him. I had many fights with him because he was
wrong. I realized that in the past the Church of Russia was under communism and the
Russian Metropolitans couldn’t talk because they did what the Secretary-General of
the Party told them to do. 29

“Sadness” and threats to strike Church of Cyprus off diptychs by Russian Orthodox Church. Orthodox Times. 24
October 2020. https://orthodoxtimes.com/sadness-and-threats-to-strike-church-of-cyprus-off-diptychs-by-russianorthodox-church/
28
“Metropolitan Hilarion: in the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, we
must go through this difficult period,” May 22, 2022, https://hilarion.ru/social/mitropolit-ilarion-vovzaimootnosheniyakh-mezhdu-russkoy-pravoslavnoy-tserkovyu-i-rimsko-katolichesk.html.
29
“Archbishop of Cyprus: Kirill is in a frenzy, his Metropolitans are afraid to approach him,” Orthodox Times, June
https://orthodoxtimes.com/archbishop-of-cyprus-kirill-is-in-a-frenzy-his-metropolitans-are-afraid-to6,
2022,
approach-him/.
27
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Hilarion’s 104 days of war ended with the decision of the Holy Synod of the ROC on June
7 to relocate three dioceses of Crimea “into direct canonical and administrative subordination to
the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.” 30 The decision was a reaction to the changes adopted to
the charter of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)--which is formally an exarchate of the
Russian Church under the Moscow Patriarch-whereby it claimed total self-reliance and
independence from the Patriarchate of Moscow. 31
The situation of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was a direct responsibility of the DECR,
wherefore the question emerges whether the quest for independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church could be seen as a failure of performance of the Chairman of the DECR (discussed below
in the subsection “leadership as result”). Here we highlight the fact that Hilarion’s public
comments did not overlap with the official position of the ROC. Hilarion said that this statement
did not yield any new status to the UOC, “/…/ on the contrary, it has once again confirmed that it
has the status of independence and independence that was given to it back in 1990.” 32 In principle,
the Holy Synod of the ROC agreed, but added that any “additions and amendments to the Statute
on the Governance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church /…/ are to be submitted for approval to the
Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.” 33 Consequently, while the Holy Synod said that the UOC
had no right to make such decisions at all, according to Hilarion the related decisions did not
change the status of UOC, a position that seemed not to question the decision adopted by the UOC.
The decision of the Holy Synod of the ROC to ‘take over’ the dioceses in Crimea from the
UOC is a religious critical juncture in the Russia-Ukraine conflict escalation. Critical junctures are
steps in conflict escalation, where each step relies on the previous one and leaves an enduring
legacy. 34 Each step requires its own justification (or, legitimating narrative). Thus, when the
agenda of the actors becomes more radical (e.g., they chose military action instead of negotiations),

Journals of the Holy Synod from June 7, 2022.
“Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council declares full independence,” Interfax, May 27, 2022,
https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/79642/.
32
“What is Happening in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Should be Understood in the Context of the Unprecedented
Pressure Exerted on it,” May 29, 2022, https://hilarion.ru/social/mitropolit-ilarion-proiskhodyashchee-v-ukrainskoypravoslavnoy-tserkvi-sleduet-ponimat-v-kontekste-o.html.
33
Minutes of the Holy Synod of 29th May 2022, http://www.patriarchia.ru/en/db/text/5931476.html.
34
Jakob Hauter, “How the War Began: Conceptualizing Conflict Escalation in Ukraine’s Donbas”, The Soviet and
Post-Soviet Review 48, no. 2 (2021), 153, 155.
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then this change of policy goes together with a change (radicalization) in strategic narratives. 35 In
December 2021 and January 2022 Russian secular leaders (President Vladimir Putin and Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov) played the game of negotiations; their demands to NATO and the United
States involved arguments that dealt only with security and military concerns. The strategic
narrative that attributes Neo-Nazism to Ukrainian nationalism was adopted together with the intent
to invade. 36 The February 24, 2022, Russian invasion of Ukraine was a (secular) critical juncture.
In this perspective, the annexation of Crimea and the intervention of Russia in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions in Spring 2014 was an earlier secular critical juncture for the European
Neighborhood Policy. 37 It changed the context, the relationships, and patterns of interaction. It had
a lasting impact (critical junctures of conflict escalation have lasting impacts until the process of
de-escalation takes over).
In the sphere of religious relations, one critical juncture has been the emergence of the
autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2018-2019. We argue that another religious
critical juncture took place on June 7, 2022, when the Holy Synod of the ROC virtually abolished
its own UOC from Crimea.
Before this event, the common knowledge, along with the assessment of experts, was that
in Ukrainian territories occupied or annexed by Russia, the non-Orthodox religious groups were
either banned, persecuted, or required re-registration (according to strict requirements) and the
only (virtually established) representative of the Orthodox was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of
the Moscow Patriarchate. This was the expert knowledge and common perception regarding the
occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk as well as for Crimea. 38

Elias Götz and Jørgen Staun, “Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalized narratives,”
Contemporary Security Policy 43, no. 3 (2022), 482–497; John Hogan and David Doyle, “The Importance of Ideas:
An A Priori Critical Juncture Framework”, Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 4 (2007), 884.
36
For example, Sergey Lavrov used the term ’neo-Nazis’ first two weeks before the start of the invasion, when he
said: „This [Budapest] Memorandum did not oblige Russia, Britain or the US to recognise the anti-constitutional coup
d’etat that neo-Nazis and ultra-radicals staged in February 2014.“ „Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and
answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with UK Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss,
Moscow“, February 10, 2022, https://mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/1797897/.
37
Nikki Ikani, “Change and Continuity in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Ukraine Crisis as a Critical
Juncture,” Geopolitics 24, no. 1 (2019), 20–50.
38
Oksana Vysoven, Yuriy Figurnyi, Valentyna Molotkina, and Nina Brehunets, “Repressive Policy of the Occupiers
During the Declared Russian-Ukrainian Hybrid War Against Religious Communities of Ukraine 2014–2022,”
Occasional Papers of Religion in Eastern Europe 42, no. 6 (2022), article 3, 17-18; Felix Corley and John Kinahan,
“DONBAS:
Luhansk:
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Forum
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February
23,
2022.
https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2721; Felix Corley, “DONBAS: Donetsk: three Protestant churches
banned,” Forum 18, October 4, 2021, https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2689.
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After June 7, 2022, a new paradigm of cuius regio, eius religio (who owns the territory,
also owns the religion) is implemented fully in Crimea and not in all religious relations, but
particularly in the relations between UOC and ROC.
The Russian Federation has been dreaming and planning to unite other occupied territories
of Ukraine (e.g., Kherson) with Russia. If Russia succeeds and replicates the same strategy of
having no Ukrainian Orthodox Church in territories they (falsely) claim to be the territory of
Russian Federation, then this change of policy transforms the religious situation, which used to be
“in eastern Ukraine and Crimea radically in favor of the UOC.” 39 It would lead to a situation where
there would be no more UOC in the territories conquered or annexed by the Russian Federation.
UOC is under pressure also from the parliament and government of Ukraine. In sum,
Engjellushe Morina and Andrew Wilson predict that:
[T]he 2018 solution of having two canonical Orthodox churches in Ukraine seems
unlikely to survive the current war. It may not even survive the current phase of the
war, as Ukraine presses ahead with derussification on other fronts, including
restrictions on Russian books and music...” 40
The religious critical juncture of June 7, 2022, changed the nature of the relations in the
field of religion drastically for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
Leadership as Process
As mentioned above, the secular critical junctures in the conflict escalation between Russia
and Ukraine have been the annexation of Crimea and military intervention by Russia in Eastern
regions of Ukraine in 2014 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
The transition from indirect intervention, diplomacy, and negotiations to an open war is a
change in the process of leadership (‘process’ referring to the “way we do it”). Both before and
after February 24, 2022, Hilarion made publicly known his attitude regarding war as a means of
international relations and method of conflict solution. Hilarion did not express the endorsement
of the Russian effort to the extent that Patriarch Kirill did, but his attitude regarding war and the
Church was ambiguous both before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Vysoven et al., “Repressive Policy of the Occupiers”, 18.
Engjellushe Morina and Andrew Wilson, “Russia, Ukraine, and the Orthodox Church: Where Religion Meets
Geopolitics and War,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/russia-ukraineand-the-orthodox-church-where-religion-meets-geopolitics-and-war/.
39
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In January 2022, Hilarion hoped that the conflict would be solved by diplomacy and
negotiations, but he agreed with the concerns of the Russian government that led to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. He endorsed the security concerns of the Russian Federation that were
submitted to NATO and the United States on December 21, 2021, calling for formal guarantees
that Ukraine and other ex-Soviet republics would not be NATO members and US forces and
weapons would be withdrawn from Europe. He commented: “It is quite natural that Russia insists
on certain security guarantees so that NATO weapons are not placed directly at its borders and are
not directed at Russian cities.” 41
We need to emphasize here that the narratives of security (including NATO expansion andor the possibility of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO) and the geopolitical status of Russia
as a great power in the global world are part of the secular strategic narratives in Russia and not
the key narratives whereby the ROC and its leaders endorse and legitimate the Russian war efforts.
Metropolitan Hilarion mentioned NATO no more during 104 days following the Russian invasion
of Ukraine, and Patriarch Kirill mentioned NATO just once in March, when he attributed the cause
of conflict to the NATO enlargement:
Over time, however, forces that openly view Russia as an enemy have come close to
its borders. NATO countries are building up their military power year after year, month
after month, oblivious to Russia's fears that these weapons will one day turn against
it. 42
Patriarch Kirill did not endorse the Russian invasion of Ukraine swiftly. Particularly the
ministers of UOC expected Patriarch Kirill to take a stance on the war, but Kirill did not do it for
weeks. Hence, Kirill became criticized in the international community “first for his silence and
then for his apparent support of the conflict.” 43
Patriarch Kirill presented many narratives and used several rhetorical strategies that were
not articulated by Hilarion or were overwhelmingly more often delivered and used by the Patriarch
during the 104 days of this study:
1. The ongoing war is “an internecine/internal strife”:
41
“The Russian Orthodox Church is also against Ukraine's accession to NATO,” RISU, January 17, 2022,
https://risu.ua/en/the-russian-orthodox-church-is-also-against-ukraines-accession-to-nato_n125146.
42
“His Holiness Patriarch Kirill sent a message to the Acting Secretary General of the WCC in connection with the
events in Ukraine,” March 10, 2022, https://mospat.ru/ru/news/89069/.
43
Elise Ann Allen, “Pope, Kirill may meet at religious congress in Kazakhstan in September”, Crux, June 2, 2022.
https://cruxnow.com/vatican/2022/06/pope-kirill-may-meet-at-religious-congress-in-kazakhstan-in-september.
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“May the Lord protect the peoples who are part of the common space of the Russian
Orthodox Church from internecine strife [междоусобной брани].” 44
“…may the Lord protect the Russian land from internecine warfare and from the
invasion of foreigners…” 45
2. Peace is conditioned/dependent on the unity of Russian and Ukrainian peoples:
“... today it is necessary to work for the restoration of peaceful life in Ukraine and the
Donbas. … I have no doubt that Russia will make the necessary efforts to create this
peaceful life, in which the prevailing principle will be the preservation of unity
between peoples based on mutual understanding.” 46
3. ‘Spiritual brothers’ cannot be in conflict:
“... I have said before that the peoples of Russia and Ukraine, who came out of the
single Kiev baptismal font, are united by the Orthodox faith and are bound by a
common historical destiny, cannot be considered the culprits of this situation. They
have no and cannot have an interest in the conflict.“ 47
Messages and statements of Hilarion not delivered by Patriarch Kirill focused on the
humanitarian mission of the Church, 48 war ‘not a conflict solution method,’ 49 and ‘war may have
disastrous consequences for Russia.’ 50 Hilarion seemed to have the kind of second thoughts about
the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which he did not have regarding the 2014 Russian operations in
the territory of Ukraine. In 2014, Hilarion was the official spokesperson for the Moscow
Patriarchate and was the one who crafted official statements on the crisis in Ukraine. 51 He

“Patriarch Kirill urged believers to pray for peace and unity of the Church,” February 27, 2022,
https://mospat.ru/ru/news/89032/.
45
“Patriarchal sermon on the day of Radonitsa after the Liturgy in the Archangel Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin,”
May 3, 2022, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5922848.html.
46
“Speech by His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the X Parliamentary Meetings in the Federation Council of the Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation,” May 17, 2022, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5926129.html.
47
“Speech by His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the X Parliamentary Meetings.”
48
“Metropolitan Hilarion: We have supported and will continue to support the unity of our Church,” May 28, 2022,
https://hilarion.ru/social/mitropolit-ilarion-my-podderzhivali-i-budem-dalshe-podderzhivat-edinstvo-nasheytserkvi.html.
49
“The Church prays that the conflict between Russia and the West will be resolved peacefully,” February 20, 2022,
https://hilarion.ru/social/mitropolit-ilarion-tserkov-molitsya-chtoby-konflikt-rossii-i-zapada-reshilsya-mirnymputem.html.
50
“Metropolitan Hilarion: the figure of Rasputin was extremely controversial,” March 21, 2022,
https://hilarion.ru/social/mitropolit-ilarion-figura-rasputina-byla-chrezvychayno-protivorechivoy.html.
51
Nicholas E. Denysenko, The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of Separation (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois
University Press, 2018), 191.
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attributed the blame on Greek Catholics, who according to him were unlike the canonical UOC
and had taken sides. 52
After February 24, 2022, Hilarion did not question the support the ROC gave to the Soviet
Union during the Second World War. In the program “Church and Peace” on the channel “Russia
24,” he said on May 8, 2022:
From the very first day of the Great Patriotic War, the Church was with its people. The
first person to address the people on the radio was Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow
and Kolomna. He did it even before Stalin addressed the people. ... Then, throughout
the Great Patriotic War, the Church was very active in helping the front. With the
money collected by the Church, a tank column named after Dmitry Donskoy was
created. Many clergymen visited the front line, helped refugees. Wherever the Church
was allowed, it was present. Of course, together with all the people, the Church
celebrated Victory Day and continues to celebrate it for 77 years. 53
Was 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine qualitatively different for Hilarion? Did he not
identify it with the patriotic fight against Nazism the way it was presented by Vladimir Putin and
Sergey Lavrov? Andrey Shishkov commented that Hilarion had informed Patriarch Kirill about
the red lines regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict he was unwilling to cross, and, according to
Shishkov, among the reasons why he was dismissed from his office was the fact that he did not
deliver statements in support of the military operations. 54
Andrey Shishkov’s comment has a point, but Hilarion’s ‘silence’ on the Russian invasion
has more layers. Until 2022, Metropolitan Hilarion had a position of professor at the University of
Fribourg, Switzerland. On March 8, 2022, the faculty of theology of Fribourg University asked
Hilarion to condemn the Russian invasion and to call on the Russian President to withdraw his
troops. Hilarion chose not to. He thanked the faculty for years of fruitful collaboration and
suspended his position as a full professor. 55

“Metropolitan Hilarion: Actions of the Uniates Have Caused Great Damage Not Only to the Ukraine and Her
Citizens, but Also to the Orthodox-Catholic Dialogue,” June 3, 2014, https://mospat.ru/en/2014/06/03/news103524/.
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The international communities outside Russia and Ukraine, have focused most on what
Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion have said regarding the invasion and expected them to
call the invasion an aggression and point the finger toward Putin. This aspect is important because
religious leaders would thus delegitimize the invasion. However, this is only one side of the coin.
The religious leaders legitimize the invasion primarily not by blaming NATO or calling authorities
in Kiev Neo-Nazi sympathizers, but by spreading the religious doctrine of the Russian world.
The secular themes of the Russian strategic culture–e.g. security concerns such as the
expansion of NATO and alleged militarization of Ukraine; Russia’s status as a ‘great power’ in
the global world order, Russia representing ‘true sovereignty’ vis-à-vis Western powers – are
promoted by actors other than the ROC (e.g. “sovereign democracy” was developed by Vladislav
Surkov). 56 The religious narrative of the Russian world focuses on the historic and cultural special
relationship with the Ukraine (as a historical cradle of Russian civilization) 57 and on the spiritual,
cultural, and historical unity of Russian and Ukrainian peoples.
As mentioned above, radicalization of policy requires radicalization of legitimating
strategic narratives. Scholars of strategic narratives of Russia have identified that Putin’s decision
to start a war on February 24, 2022, was “made possible and thinkable” due to “radicalized
narratives in Russia’s strategic culture.” 58 Similarly, the annexation of Crimea and military
intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 were made possible by shifts in predominant discourses
of Russian national identity. 59
The messages of the “Russian world” by religious leaders have “played an important role
in Russia’s neo-imperial plans, as it was an active embodiment of the “Russian World" in the
spiritual, political, cultural, and humanitarian spaces of Ukraine.” 60 The narrative of (spiritual) unity
of Ukrainians and Russians with the aim of integrating Ukrainians into the Russian state, culture, and
civilization, has been used in Russian imperialism since the 17th century. Zenon E. Kohut has called

Mikhail Suslov, “‘Russian World’ Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of ‘Spheres of
Influence’,” Geopolitics 23, no. 2 (2018), 337, 338.
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it a ‘unity paradigm.’ 61 This paradigm connects Russian identity and values into a set that is
simultaneously imperial and Orthodox. 62 It legitimates Russian imperial rule of Ukrainian
territories and peoples. This paradigm was even utilized by Soviet authorities in order to attain the
loyalty of Ukrainian to the Soviet order. 63 The ‘unity paradigm’ was a ‘master-frame’ whereby
Putin legitimated the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In a March 18, 2014, speech he said:
Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of
ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting
Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human
values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 64
If so, then the key indicator of Hilarion’s attitude toward the Russian invasion is not so
much about war as a method, but whether he re-thought his positions regarding the religious
conception of the “Russian world.” However, there is no evidence of Hilarion having revised or
having had second thoughts about the concept of the “Russian world” during the “104 days of
war.” His position is identical to Patriarch Kirill’s. Although Kirill devoted more energy to
emphasizing the common history, land, destiny of Russians and Ukrainians, and Hilarion
expressed quantitively more criticism of the Ukrainian “schismatics,” they both were the
messengers who upheld the narrative of One (common) Church and spiritual unity of Russians and
Ukrainians.
It is the cases that Patriarch Kirill’s contribution to the Russian war effort exceeds Metropolitan
Hilarion’s in significant ways. Hilarion does not rhetorically demonize the adversaries (what can be
called “religious demonization”). Patriarch Kirill, however, claims that the enemies of Russia work in
the service of the devil:

... Our prayer today is to preserve the spiritual unity of the Russian land. And why did
external forces rise up so much on the Russian land? Why do they seek to destroy it,
to divide it, to pit brother against brother? There is a mention in Scripture of a certain
force that keeps the coming of the antichrist into the world. 65
Zenon E. Kohut, “Origins of the Unity Paradigm: Ukraine and the Construction of Russian National History (16201860),” Eighteenth-Century Studies 35, no. 1 (2001), 70–76.
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The ‘unity paradigm’ has existed and been used strategically in Russian politics for
centuries. However, the present application of the concept (the religious version of the Russian
World) is articulated, represented, and promoted mostly by Patriarch Kirill. It has been called
“Kirill’s doctrine of Russian nationalism” 66 and Kirill’s “Russian world” strategy. 67 When
addressing secular audiences, Kirill uses the concept “Russian world,” but when speaking to
Church internal circles, he uses the term “Holy Russia.” 68
Thus, several of those who have called for the application of sanctions on Patriarch Kirill–
e.g., MPs of the Ukrainian Parliament in April 2022, 69 the Archbishop of Chernihiv 70--have
perceived religious leaders of the ROC to be involved in the Russian invasion of Ukraine by the
promotion of the ideology of the Russian World and have listed Hilarion among those who ought
to be sanctioned together with Patriarch Kirill. 71
Hilarion had promoted the “Russian world” ideology together with Patriarch Kirill in
2010, 72 in 2014 73 and kept doing it during “104 days” of 2022.
Leadership as Result
Metropolitan Hilarion claimed that his dismissal was not caused by any fault in his
performance at the head of DECR. However, there is a list of developments that do not look like
successes of DECR (for the ROC and from the perspective of the ROC) during the first half of
2022.
Alexander Verkhovsky, “‘Kirill’s Doctrine’ and the Potential Transformation of Russian Orthodox Christianity,”
in Orthodox Paradoxes: Heterogeneities and Complexities in Contemporary Russian Orthodoxy, ed. Katya Tolstaya
(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 72.
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In May 2022, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople recognized the autocephaly of
Archbishopric of Ohrid (North Macedonia). 74 The ROC had argued that exclusive canonical rights
in North Macedonia belong to the Serbian Church. 75 It endorsed the outcome (by claiming to
support the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church), but the fact that it was the Patriarchate of
Constantinople who acted as a sole mediator of the status of the Orthodox Church of North
Macedonia was a hard pill for the ROC to swallow. 76 Accordingly, Metropolitan Hilarion had to
explain the outcome to the Russian public. 77
The relations between the ROC and the UOC had deteriorated while the Department for
External Church Relations under Hilarion’s leadership was responsible for Ukraine. Hilarion’s
own explanation of the independence declaration of the UOC may have been seen as a mere
“excuse” by the ROC synod, not a substantive reason for what the UOC leaders did. Just two days
before his departure from his DECR duties in Moscow, on June 5, Hilarion stated in a television
program 78 that the UOC’s reason for its declarations of independence from the Moscow
Patriarchate was the UOC’s need to thwart the threat of re-registration brought on by the Ukrainian
government’s 2018 law requiring a re-naming of the church that would directly show its
connection to the Moscow Patriarchate. Hilarion argued that, because local Ukrainian authorities
and unruly community groups were threatening to use force against UOC churches to change
jurisdictions to the “schismatics,” the UOC needed to protect its property by this public declaration
of independence from Moscow. Such an argument now appears to have been too sympathetic to
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church position in the view of Patriarch Kirill and/or the members of the
Synod that made the decision to move Hilarion to Budapest.
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On June 6, 2022, Hilarion had to also explain the situation in Lithuania, where several
clergymen had appealed for help to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. 79 In one way or another,
the crises in the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Orthodox Churches were repercussions of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine.
Additionally, the meeting between the Patriarch of Moscow and Pope Francis (the
organization of which is also one of the main tasks of the Chairman of the DECR) was postponed.
This list of “failures of the leadership performance” is not exhaustive and is based on
indirect evidence. However, it highlights that the “lack of faults” argument by Hilarion should not
be taken at face value.
Leadership as Person
Finally, it cannot be excluded that among the reasons for the dismissal of Hilarion was his
highly popular personality. Katherine Kelaidis has argued that his dismissal can be interpreted “as
an attempt on the part of the Russian Patriarch to exile a powerful and ambitious rival.” 80
Did Hilarion then err regarding the First Law of Power of Robert Greene, “Never outshine
your master”? Robert Greene explains this law of power as follows:
Always make those above you feel comfortably superior. In your desire to please and
impress them, do not go too far in displaying your talents or you might accomplish the
opposite--inspire fear and insecurity. Make your masters appear more brilliant than
they are and you will attain the heights of power. 81
When he joined Patriarch Kirill’s team in 2009, Hilarion was the sole Russian hierarch to
defend a thesis at Oxford. 82 Over the years he has built a thorough personal presence in the web
and public sphere through regular appearances in media programs, transcripts of sermons and
statements published on his web-site, and even in July 2022, he continued to address his followers
in Russia via video-clips published on his web-site. Hilarion has a well-developed public profile,
image, personality, and popularity of his own.
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Sure, Metropolitan Hilarion did refrain from direct support of ‘war as a conflict solution
method’ and probably was expected by the Kremlin to be more vocal on this issue. However, when
we look at his successor Metropolitan Anthony, we see that he almost never delivers messages and
statements of his own, not to mention not having a personal webpage, not publishing transcripts
of public appearances, and eschewing regular appearances in media programs. Paradoxically,
Metropolitan Anthony does not speak about war either. Based on this evidence we could conclude
that the ‘number 2’ in the ROC is expected to be more silent on themes related to war and conflict
in Ukraine than Metropolitan Hilarion used to be.
Conclusions
This study focused on the reasons why Metropolitan Hilarion was dismissed from the office
of the Chairman of the DECR on the 104th day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The results of
the study indicate, that Hilarion was both unwilling to delegitimate the Russian invasion and
unwilling to endorse it the way Patriarch Kirill did. However, during 13 years at the office of the
Chairman of the DECR, Hilarion was committed to advance the “Russian world” concept
legitimating Russian imperialist policies over the territory and population of Ukraine together with
Patriarch Kirill. Hilarion did not revoke any of his positions regarding the “Russian world.”
Time will tell whether promotion of the “Russian world,” which is the key narrative
whereby religious leaders of the ROC legitimize Russian war efforts in the territory of Ukraine,
was for Hilarion merely a duty related to the office of Chairman of the DECR or will he be one of
the main proponents of this concept also in his new position as primate of the Russian Orthodox
Dioceses of Budapest and Hungary. If the latter is true, then this will compromise his ‘silence’ on
the Russian invasion of Ukraine even further.
We noted earlier that Hilarion’s advanced education at Oxford set him apart from the other
hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church. His erudition about church history, the Church Fathers,
and theology may also have made him appear in a different category than most of the ROC
hierarchs. His mentor at Oxford University was the renowned scholar of Orthodoxy, Kallistos
Ware, who, like Hilarion, was a monk and a Metropolitan in the Orthodox Church. 83 One major
lesson of Ware to his students, according to his eulogist Brandon Gallaher, was that “to go against
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our conscience would be to lose one’s soul.” 84 Whatever ambiguities and ambivalences Hilarion
had been facing in regard to the attack on Ukraine, when faced with the concrete situation of war
involving the Russian state supported by the Church’s legitimation, this critical juncture for the
Church, he seems to have had a problem of conscience that further separated him from the
hierarchs of the Holy Synod.
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